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THE VOTING RIGHTS CASES
Very few statutes can ever have been drafted with a warier eye
to the prospect of litigation, or a keener intention to ward it off
as long as possible, than the Voting Rights Act of 1965.1 It was en-
acted, indeed, as a substitute for litigation, which had proved a sadly
inadequate engine of reform. Care was taken, therefore, to ensure
that the enterprise launched by the statute would be going before
litigation could test it in the local federal courts,2 and § 14(b) hope-
fully designated the District Court for the District of Columbia as
the only forum in which suit attacking the statute on a broad front
could be brought.8 Yet Congress, in trying to escape the clutches
of hostile courts, did not avoid the precipitate embrace of a sympa-
thetic one: the Supreme Court of the United States. The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 came to judgment there with extraordinary
rapidity and under extraordinary conditions.
Alexander M. Bickel is Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale
University.
1 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is Public Law 89-110,89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965);
79 Star. 437 (1965); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. (1965 Suppl.). It is also reproduced as
an appendix to the Court's opinion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
337-55 (1965), and, for convenience, references to the statute hereafter made will
be to the Court's appendix.
2 See §§ 4(b), 9(a), and 14(b), 383 U.S. at 341, 346, 353.
3 "No court other than the District Court for the District of Columbia or a court
of appeals in any proceeding under section 9 shall have jurisdiction to issue any
declaratory judgment pursuant to section 4 or section 5 or any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of
any provision of this Act or any action of any Federal officer or employee pur-
suant thereto." 383 U.S. at 353.
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I. SOUTH CAROLINA V. KATZENBACH
The train of events that led to the decision of South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach4 on March 7, 1966, in the Supreme Court was
apparently first set in motion some three weeks after the Voting
Rights Act was approved. On August 31, 1965, Leander H. Perez,
Jr., District Attorney of Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, filed suit in
the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court of Louisiana against Bruce
Rhiddlehoover and Billy Travis, federal voting examiners appointed
pursuant to § 6 of the Act to serve in that parish.0 District Attor-
ney Perez, represented by his father, Leander the Elder, Baron of
Plaquemines, asked that the defendants be forbidden to register as
voters persons who, in the District Attorney's view, failed to meet
valid requirements of state law. The complaint did not put in issue
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act. It accepted arguendo
the Act's suspension of "tests or devices" previously administered
in Louisiana, and contended only that the Attorney General and
the Civil Service Commission, in discharging their statutory duty of
instructing examiners to abide by those other qualifications pre-
scribed by state law which are not inconsistent with the federal
Constitution and laws" had misinterpreted the state law; chiefly, it
seems, by being in error on the question whether qualifications re-
lating to age and residence needed to be met by the date of regis-
tration or by the date of the next election. The Fifth Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Louisiana issued an ex parte temporary restraining
order, whereupon the defendant examiners removed to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. There
the temporary restraining order was promptly dissolved on Sep-
tember 3. The following month, District Judge Ellis also denied
plaintiff's motion to remand. Thus, except during a hurricane, reg-
istration proceeded in Plaquemines Parish, although Judge Ellis-er-
roneously, as one may well think-denied defendants' motion to
dismiss.7
Other direct attacks on the administration of the Act foundered
on § 14(b) with even greater promptness.8 But a series of suits be-
4383 U.S. 301 (1966). 5 1d.at 343-44. 6 §§ 7(b) and 9(b), id.at 344-45, 347.
7 Perez v. Rhiddlehoover, 247 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. La. 1965).
8 O'Keefe v. New York City Board of Elections, 246 F. Supp. 978 (S.D. N.Y.
1965); McCann v. Paris, 244 F. Supp. 870 (WD. Va. 1965).
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gun in September in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana proved
more troublesome. Injunctions were issued by state courts in a num-
ber of counties in those states against the appropriate local officials,
forbidding them to place on the voting rolls the names of voters reg-
istered by federal examiners. These injunctions did not interfere
with registration, but they challenged the constitutionality of the
Act and, if obeyed, would have rendered registration futile. If
obeyed, they could also have subjected the state officials to whom
they were addressed, and possibly the state officials and judges who
obtained and issued them, to criminal prosecution under § 12 of
the Act."°
Whatever their political and personal preferences, the state elec-
tion officials were thus offered a Hobson's choice. It is difficult to
imagine, however, that the Attorney General could not have solved
their dilemma by instituting actions under § 12(d) of the Act for
preventive relief against them. Actually he believed, as he later
made clear, that he had ample authority to bring such suits, not
only pursuant to § 12(d), but also, reasonably enough, in the ex-
ercise of the inherent power of the United States "to vindicate its
rights in its own courts," as well as under 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (c)."
Yet the Attorney General made no move. His attention turned
instead to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
An argument can be made, proceeding from the bare text of
§ 14(b),12 that a federal district court would be free to adjudicate
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act in a case in which the
Attorney General was seeking an injunction against a state official-
an injunction that, arguably, should not issue unless the Act was con-
stitutional. In such a case, the result of a holding that the Act was un-
constitutional would not be the sort of decree, forbidding execution
of the Act, which § 14(b) allows only the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia to issue. This is not much of an argument, but
in voting cases tried before federal district judges in the Deep South,
9 See U.S. COMMISSioN ON Cvm RIGHTs, THE VoTNG RIGHTS AcT ... Tim FST
MoNms App. E, 74-78 (1965).
10 383 U.S. at 350-52.
11Brief in Support of Motions for Leave To File Original Complaints and
Motions for Expedited Consideration, Nos. 23, 24, 25, Orig., at pp. 9-10, United
States v. Alabama, 382 U.S. 897 (1965).
12 See note 3 supra.
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the Attorney General has been known to lose cases, for the time
being, on arguments that were not much.18 With spring primaries
impending, time was then of the essence, and to go before some of
the federal district judges in Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana
was to take a chance. Once having taken his chances even in one
district court, the Attorney General would very likely find that
he had made an irrevocable election. He would be foreclosed from
bringing suits against the states themselves in the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court. For in these circumstances he would
be coming into the original jurisdiction with nothing but a form
of direct appeal, and possibly an interlocutory one, at that. More-
over, the outlook for the success of the Act in general was good.
The Act was being widely administered and obeyed. It was, in
truth, having its period of maximum effectiveness in placing large
numbers of Negroes on voting rolls-more and faster than it has
done since. 14 Any decree holding it unconstitutional, no matter
how obviously vulnerable and temporary, would have had its ad-
verse effect on officials elsewhere who had been complying-re-
luctantly and not universally, but widely and voluntarily. And so
the Attorney General took no chances.
The potentially ugly situation in the several counties in Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana solved itself well before winter. The Ala-
bama election officials who were under state injunction, not having
been sued by the Attorney General, sued him. They obtained a
decree from a three-judge federal court' 5 dissolving all the Ala-
bama injunctions.-" In deference to the plain command of § 14(b),
the court did not pass on the constitutionality of the Act but went
about its business by assuming it. The efforts to thwart execution
of the Act in Mississippi and Louisiana evidently then collapsed of
18 See, for one of many examples, the litigation history recited by the Court of
Appeals in United States v. Ramsey, 353 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1965). And Judge Ellis,
in the Plaquemines Parish case mentioned above, see note 7 supra, although he
granted relief, failed to dismiss the case, as he should have done pursuant to § 14(b).
14 See U.S. COMMssIoN Ox CrvIL RIGHTS, op. cit. supra note 9: N.Y. Times,
April 11, 1966, p. 38, col. 7 (City Ed.) ("Negro Vote Lists Rise 50% in South").
15 A three-judge court was presumably available to them, since they were for-
mally suing to enjoin enforcement of the Act, but would not have been available
to the Attorney General. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2282, 'with § 101 (d) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 242 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(h) (1964).
16 Reynolds v. Katzenbach, 248 F. Supp. 593 (SD. Ala. 1965).
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their own weight. But by then it was late November, and the At-
torney General had long since committed himself to litigating in
the original jurisdiction.
On September 29, 1965, South Carolina moved for leave to file
a complaint against the Attorney General in the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. The complaint challenged the constitution-
ality of the Act as a whole, except for § 3 (authorizing appoint-
ment of examiners, not by the Attorney General acting on his own,
but as part of a judicial decree) ,17 § 14(c) (nullifying the New York
requirement of literacy in English as applied to Puerto Ricans edu-
cated in American-flag schools), s § 10 (authorizing the Attorney
General to institute suits challenging the poll tax)," and one or two
miscellaneous sections. The response of the Attorney General was
to move for leave to file complaints of his own, in the name of the
United States, against Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Each
of these complaints alleged that local election officials were obeying
state court injunctions that forbade them to comply with the Vot-
ing Rights Act. The Attorney General asked for judgments de-
claring the constitutionality of § § 4, 6, and 7 of the Act, insofar
as these sections suspended literacy and other tests, authorized the
appointment of federal examiners, and required the listing as voters
of persons registered by examiners. He asked also that the injunc-
tions issued against the local election officials be declared null and
void, and that these officials be ordered to do their federal duty. 0
On the same day on which he moved for leave to file these com-
plaints, the Attorney General responded to the South Carolina suit
in a memorandum signed by Solicitor General Marshall. The Gov-
ernment, said the Solicitor General, did not oppose South Carolina's
motion for leave to file a complaint. "For the reasons stated in the
brief of the United States in support of its motions for leave to file
original complaints [against Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana]
... filed with the Court this day.., we believe that the Court has
17 383 U.S. at 338-39.
18 Id. at 341-42.
19 Id. at 347-49.
20 Motions for Leave To File Complaints, Complaints, and Motions for Expedited
Consideration, Nos. 23, 24, 25, Orig., United States v. Alabama, United States v,
Mississippi, United States v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 897 (1965).
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jurisdiction to entertain this original action and may appropriately
exercise its jurisdiction here."
2'
But the jurisdictional issues in the two cases, South Carolina's
against the Attorney General and that of the United States against
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana were very different.22 In its
own suit, the United States was doing precisely what it could have
done in the lower federal courts. It was seeking, by the exercise of
inherent authority and of statutory authority, particularly under
§ 12(d) of the Voting Rights Act, to vindicate the supremacy of
national law, which was being flouted by officials of the named
states. The suit was against the states, rather than individual officers
of the states, because these officers were acting under state law,
and because suits against the states would reach them all most eco-
nomically. There is nothing extraordinary about framing an action
of this sort with a state as defendant. Section 601 (d) of the Civil
Rights of 1960 explicitly permits it, for example.23 All that is re-
quired to make out a case against a state in such circumstances is
that there be a real controversy-that officers of the state, acting
under state law, be engaged in obstructing the execution of national
law. 24 A controversy there was, in this instance, at the time of the
filing of the motions. Whether a case was made out in the original
jurisdiction thus became only a question of ripeness and forum non
conveniens. It was along these lines that the brief for the United
States constructed its argument.
Quite another sort of jurisdictional question was raised by South
Carolina's complaint. South Carolina sought an injunction forbid-
ding the Attorney General to execute the Voting Rights Act, which
suspended provisions of South Carolina's voter qualification law,
as well as the operation of parts of her election machinery, and
substituted federal law and machinery. The constitutionality of the
2 1 Memorandum for the Defendant, No. 22, Orig., at pp. 1-2, South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
22They had in common only the difficulty presented by § 14(b) of the Voting
Rights Act, supra note 3, which, the Solicitor General argued, should not be read
as depriving the Supreme Court of jurisdiction of appropriate original actions, "in
view of the constitutional basis of this Court's original jurisdiction." Memorandum
for the Defendant, supra note 20, at p. 2, n. 1.
2374 Stat. 92 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1964); United States v. Mississippi,
380 U.S. 128 (1965); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
24 Cf. United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463 (1936).
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Act was attacked under the Fifteenth Amendment, and also under
the Due Process and Bill of Attainder Clauses. Jurisdiction was
rested on Article III, because South Carolina was suing a citizen of
New Jersey-not at the moment, one might think, the most relevant
fact about Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, but apparently a jurisdic-
tional fact nonetheless. The decisive issue, however, was whether
South Carolina had standing. The only interests, if any, that could
give South Carolina standing were her functional interest as a sov-
ereign, her interest, that is, in the continued execution of her own
laws without hindrance from national authority, and her interest
as protector of those of her citizens entitled to vote under her pres-
ent laws, whose vote would be diluted by the addition of new
voters to the rolls. In no fashion did the brief in support of the
motions of the United States to file complaints against Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana discuss the question of South Carolina's
standing, or otherwise attempt to justify acceptance of jurisdiction
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and this despite Solicitor General
Marshall's assertion that for "reasons stated in the brief of the
United States in support of its motions for leave to file . . . we
believe that the court has jurisdiction to entertain" South Carolina
v. Katzenbach. This was simply a way of shuffling the jurisdictional
issue in South Carolina v. Katzenbach from one set of papers to
another, faster than the eye could follow. In neither did the Gov-
ernment discuss it. And in the shuffle, the issue got lost altogether,
for an implied promise by the Government to return to it at the
argument on the merits was never carried out.
25
25 "At all events," the Solicitor General said in his memorandum in South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach, "the Court may grant the State's motion for leave to file a com-
plaint without now resolving the question of jurisdiction, which can properly be
postponed to the time when the case is considered on the merits." Memorandum
for the Defendant, No. 22, Orig., at p. 2, n. 1, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966). But in the brief for the Attorney General on the merits, juris-
dictional problems were dismissed in a footnote in this fashion: "In view of the
Court's decision to grant plaintiff's motion for leave to file the complaint herein,
we proceed to the merits in this brief." For the rest, there was merely the sugges-
tion, later accepted by the Court, 383 U.S. at 316-17, that §§ 11 and 12(a), (b),
and (c), imposing criminal sanctions and authorizing injunctive relief, which
South Carolina was attacking along with most of the rest of the Act, were not
ripe for adjudication since they had not yet been invoked. Brief for the Defend-
ant, No. 22, Orig., at pp. 2, 3, nn. 3, 4, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966).
But see United States v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. La. 1966), which invoked
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Having decided-not unreasonably, for only hindsight tells us
that the situation was going to solve itself without such drastic
action-that he had no safe alternative but himself to seek redress
in the original jurisdiction, the Attorney General presumably feared
that it would somehow damage his position if at the same time he
tried to block South Carolina's access. He wound up in the end,
not with his own case, but with South Carolina's. The motions of
the United States for leave to file bills of complaint against Ala-
bama, Mississippi, and Louisiana were denied.26 On the same day,
South Carolina's motion was summarily granted, Black, Harlan,
and Stewart, JJ., dissenting.27 The Court, unaided by counsel, chose
what was jurisdictionally by far the weaker of the two cases offered.
"Original jurisdiction," said Chief Justice Warren's opinion for
the Court, without dissent on this issue, "is founded on the pres-
ence of a controversy between a State and a citizen of another
State under Art. III, § 2 of the Constitution. See Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 [1945].' '2s But in that case Georgia
had a proprietary claim, and to the extent that she was also suing
as protector of her people, she was not, as Mr. Justice Douglas
pointed out for the Court, suing the United States or a federal offi-
cer, and she was not seeking "to protect her citizens from the op-
eration of Federal statutes. ' 29 Nor, in the instant case, was South
Carolina or one of her political subdivisions suing pursuant to con-
gressional direction, as under § 4(a) of the Voting Rights Act,30
to establish facts on which application of federal law, or an exemp-
tion from it, is made to depend. These distinctions are crucial. It
has heretofore been established that a state is not, as the phrase goes,
the parens patriae of her citizens as against the federal government.
It is no part of a state's "duty or power," said the Court in Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon,31 "to enforce their [her citizens'] rights in respect
to their relations with the Federal Government. In that field, it is
§ 11 (b). This suit was filed on December 17, 1965. The District Court (West, J.)
held the section unconstitutional as applied, although it shored up its dismissal
of the suit with an alternate factual finding, as well.
26382 U.S. 897 (1965).
27 d. at 898. 29 324 U.S. at 446-47.
28 383 U.S. at 307. 30 383 U.S. at 339-40.
3' 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923); and see Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927); Jones
ex rel. Louisiana v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 707 (1944).
[1966
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the United States and not the State which represents them as parens
patriae when such representation becomes appropriate; and to the
former, and not to the latter, they must look for such protection
measures as flow from that status." The Court in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach itself dismissed South Carolina's argument that she had
been adjudged guilty of discrimination by the Voting Rights Act,
without trial, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and of the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I. Certainly,
as the Court briefly indicated, this argument is weird enough on
its merits. But the Court went on to say: "Nor does a State have
standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional
provisions against the Federal government, the ultimate parens
patriae of every American citizen. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 485-86; Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18. ' ' 32 If this is
so, it is precisely as true with respect to the argument, which the
Court then proceeded to discuss at length on the merits, that Con-
gress exceeded its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment. It is no
less true that South Carolina lacked standing as the parent of her
citizens to urge their claim that Congress violated the Fifteenth
Amendment to their detriment, than that South Carolina lacked
standing to urge her citizens' claim that Congress inflicted harm
on them by an Act violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I.
Of course the original jurisdiction should provide a forum for
the adjudication of issues that could arise, absent a federal union,
between sovereigns, and that, absent such a union, would be dealt
with by international arbitration, or would result in international
conflict of one sort or another.8 3 The original jurisdiction serves
also for the adjudication of claims by the states against citizens and
entities not within their control-claims that the states, if they were
fully sovereign, might also prosecute in an international forum or
by unilateral means. Such claims may be founded on a state's duty
or desire, as parens patriae, to protect the interests of her own citi-
32 383 U.S. at 324.
33 See HART & WEcHsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 258
(1953); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United States v. Florida, 363
U.S. 121 (1960); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 691 (1950); United
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
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zens, and perhaps this explains Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
Finally, it may be that proprietary claims of the states, no matter
how attenuated, may be defended in the original jurisdiction against
infringement by federal law, simply and more than somewhat arbi-
trarily because they are proprietary rather than functional or pro-
tective.34 But it is altogether different for a state to be raising, as
did South Carolina, nothing more than her interest in the execution
of her own laws rather than those of Congress, and her interest in
having Congress enact only constitutional laws for application to
her citizens. A state is said to have no standing in such circum-
stances, not because the interests asserted are unreal or inadequately
particular to the state, but because by hypothesis they should not,
in such circumstances, suffice to invoke judicial action. For pur-
poses of litigation with the United States (through the officers
charged with execution of federal laws), a state should have no
recognizable interest in ensuring the fidelity of Congress to consti-
tutional restraints. Only citizens and other persons have a litigable
interest of this sort, and then only if they can show injury, being
affected either in their pocketbooks or by a disadvantageous change
in their position in the legal order. This has heretofore been the
settled view, and for good reason.
One may explain away Georgia v. Stanton3 5 as sui generis-a po-
litical question case.36 There is some support also for reading Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon as a holding that courts can find no criteria to
define the occasions when Congress may or may not tax and spend
for the general welfare-that, in other words, the General Welfare
Clause raises a political question of sorts.3 7 But there remains a
simple proposition, which perhaps the Court has seldom had occa-
sion to affirm unambiguously, but which it has equally seldom de-
nied, even tacitly, before now.38 This proposition is that the nature
34 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
3 5 6 Wall. 50 (1867).
36 Cf. Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (1867); but of. Texas v. White, 7 Wall.
700 (1869).
37 Cf. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); but cf. United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
38 Some subterranean implications that may be read into the brief order in Ala-
bama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963), need to be noted. The case is the
subject of a curious and totally ambiguous citation in the Memorandum for the
[1966
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of the federal union, the power and function of Congress and the
President, and the power and function of the judiciary all would
be radically altered if states could come into the original jurisdic-
tion at will to litigate the constitutional validity of national law
applicable within their territories. To allow the states to litigate in
this fashion-which is precisely what South Carolina was allowed
to do-would be a fundamental denial of perhaps the most innovat-
ing principle of the Constitution: the principle that the federal
government is a sovereign coexisting in the same territory with the
states and acting, not through them, like some international organi-
zation, but directly upon the citizenry, which is its own as well as
theirs. The states are built into the political structure of the feder-
ation, and play their part in the formation of its institutions. But
they are not to contest, as if between one sovereign and another
in some quasi-international forum, the actions of the national insti-
tutions. For the national government is fully in privity with the
people it governs, and needs, and should brook, no intermediaries.
It would make a mockery, moreover, of the constitutional re-
quirement of case or controversy, which is at the heart of Marshall's
argument in Marbury v. Madison and forms an essential limita-
tion on the reach of the power of judicial review, to countenance
automatic litigation-and automatic it would surely become-by
Defendant filed in answer to South Carolina's motion for leave to file in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach. The passage in question is as follows: 'ederal jurisdiction
is premised upon the portion of Clause 1 of the same Section [Art. 3, § 2] that
extends the judicial power of the United States to 'Controversies . .. between a
State and Citizens of another State.' Attorney General Katzenbach is a citizen of
New Jersey. See Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545." Memorandum for the
Defendant, No. 22, Orig., at p. 2, n. 1, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966). Alabama v. United States was Governor George C. Wallace's motion
for leave to file a complaint in the spring of 1963 to prevent the President from
using troops in Birmingham, during the marching there. In a brief order, instead
of dismissing for lack of jurisdiction with a citation to Massachusetts v. Mellon,
the Supreme Court said that all the President was shown to have done was to alert
troops for possible use in Birmingham. Such merely preparatory measures and
their possible effects in Alabama could afford no basis for relief, the Court said,
and so denied leave to file. One can hardly credit the implication of this brief
order that Alabama might otherwise have had standing, any more than one could
credit its implication that, everything else being equal, the Supreme Court would
undertake to review the exercise of presidential discretion in the use of troops
under 10 U.S.C. § 333.
39 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
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states situated no differently than was South Carolina in this in-
stance. The distinction between a Supreme Court, generally limited
in the timing and circumstances of its interventions to "cases" in
which public authority has touched private interests or the su-
premacy of national law needs to be brought home to persons pri-
vate or public, on the one hand, and the sort of council of revision
rejected by the framers, 40 on the other, would then be almost wholly
obliterated. There would then be no need to worry about who
could sue if Congress or the President created a duke, or supported
an ambassador at the Vatican, or established a church 41 or con-
ducted atomic tests, or this or that disagreeable war.42 South Caro-
lina could sue, and one or another South Carolina undoubtedly
always would, and promptly too. The consequent aggrandizement
of the judicial function is something to contemplate. Nor would
there be any call, and scarcely the possibility, as there was not in
South Carolina v. Katzenbacb, for a record exemplifying the actual
operation of a statute, bringing to the Court for constitutional judg-
ment not Congress' prophecy of the consequences of its action but
the actual flesh and blood of those consequences in the life of the
society. Time and again, precisely like a council of revision, the
Court would be pronouncing the abstraction that some law gener-
ally like the one before it would or would not generally be con-
stitutional in the generality of its applications. Such an abstraction
was what the Court was reduced to pronouncing on the merits of
South Carolina v. Katzenbacb.
The Court did no more than skim the surface of the Act. Appli-
cation of the Act is triggered by a formula having to do with the
use by a state or county of tests (such as literacy) as a prerequisite
to voting, and with the incidence of a low voting rate. The Court
held the formula rational, emphasizing that it only amounted, after
all, to a presumption, since § 4(a) also provides for termination
of coverage in any state or county which can prove to the satis-
40 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507, 513-14, n. 6 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
41 Compare Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School Prayer Cases,
[1963] SuPas rm CouRT REviEw 1, 15-33, 'with Black, Religion, Standing and the
Supreme Court's Role, 13 J. PuB. LAW 459 (1964).
42 See Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F. 2d 796 (D.C. Cir., 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 933 (1964). Cf. Luftig v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819 (D. D.C. 1966).
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faction of the District Court for the District of Columbia that for
five years past it has used no test or device "for the purpose or
with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color." South Carolina contended that these supposed
termination proceedings were a snare and could not come to any-
thing, because the burden of proof was impossible. Hence the pre-
sumption should be treated as conclusive. Not so, said the Court.
The burden of proof would turn out to be "quite bearable." 43 But
this could only be the rankest speculation, one way or the other.
It is almost farcical that such an issue should have been decided
otherwise than on the full record of an appeal from an actual termi-
nation proceeding. The Court could not possibly know when it
decided South Carolina v. Katzenbach what a termination proceed-
ing would look like.
The formula that triggers the Act is in turn triggered when the
Attorney General determines that a state or political subdivision
maintained as of November 1, 1964, "any test or device," and the
Director of the Census certifies that fewer than 50 per cent of per-
sons of voting age residing there were registered on November 1,
1964, or voted in the presidential election of that year. Section 4
goes on to say that a determination or certification of this sort by the
Attorney General or the Director of the Census, as well as a de-
termination that the conditions for appointing examiners have been
met (§ 6), or that examiners should be withdrawn (§ 13), "shall
not be reviewable in any court." The Supreme Court read this pro-
vision as denying judicial review (although what is meant by the
word "reviewable" would be open to question, depending on the
procedures used to invoke judicial action) 44 and held it constitu-
tional as such, citing United States v. California Eastern Line45 and
Srwitchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board.46 But the Cali-
fornia Eastern Line case itself indicates that the issue of a right to
judicial review has not usually been dealt with by the Court in these
absolute terms. The kind of action sought to be reviewed (whether
within administrative discretion or arguably ultra vires), and other
statutory and procedural variables have often been decisive. And
43 383 U.S. at 332.
44 Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958).
45 3 48 U.S. 3 51 (1955). 46 320 U..297 (1943).
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the authority of the Switchmen's Union case, beyond its own nar-
row circumstances, is more than highly dubious.47 It is no daring
guess to assert that if the Court had been faced with an actual case,
rather than with the bare bones of the statute, it would not have
been content with the advisory abstraction that it handed down on
the issue of a right to judicial review. The result it would have
reached would have depended on circumstances now unknown.
Finally, there was the issue which drew a pained dissent from
Mr. Justice Black. Section 5 of the Act provides that whenever any
state or county which is covered by the Act under the automatic
trigger provisions "shall enact or seek to administer any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect
on November 1, 1964," it must either submit it for approval to the
Attorney General, or else bring an action for a declaratory judg-
ment in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and show
that the new qualifications, prerequisite, etc., "does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color. ' 4 Unless the Attorney
General approves, or a declaratory judgment is obtained, the new
qualification, prerequisite, etc., cannot be effective. Mr. Justice
Black thought that this provision was unconstitutional, because the
declaratory judgment action in the District of Columbia could not
be a case or controversy.49 To this the Court's reply, in something
less than a paragraph, was that the controversy would be real and
concrete enough, 50 which is probably right, since in the manner
characteristic of declaratory judgment actions, all that the section
effects is to reverse the parties; and as under § 4(a), the point of
Massachusetts v. Mellon, discussed earlier, would not be encoun-
tered. An additional answer is that even if one suspects that such
a controversy might not be sufficiently concrete, it was surely pre-
mature to hold the section unconstitutional on this basis.
Mr. Justice Black also thought, however-and he laid much more
stress on this point-that it was, in any event, unconstitutional for
Congress to put such a suspensive veto on state laws."' As to this,
47 See JAFFE, JtuIcuLA CONTROL OF ADMnINsTAnvE AcToN 339-53 (1965).
48 383 U.S. at 342-43. 49 Id. at 357-58. 50 Id. at 335.
51 Id. at 358 et seq.
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the Court answered even more briefly that Congress had had ex-
perience with legislative stratagems continually invented by the
states to frustrate decrees and statutes in implementing the Fifteenth
Amendment and that under "the compulsion of these unique cir-
cumstances, Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner."5
The constitutional holding, and the reasoning supporting it, are all
contained in the word "permissibly." But the issue surely has com-
plexities, and surely depends on variables that could not conceiv-
ably form the basis for either the Court's or Mr. Justice Black's
conclusion at this time, on this record. At one extreme, there should
not be much question that Congress could, under the Fifteenth
Amendment, prospectively suspend not only the literacy and un-
derstanding tests which have been in use in some states but also any
future variations of them.a At the other extreme, if a state changed
its minimum age for voting and refused to submit this change either
to the Attorney General or to the District Court for the District
of Columbia, it would have a strong constitutional case. And there
is a whole spectrum of problems between these extremes, which
might have become evident and to which solutions might have
varied, if the Court had allowed real cases to arise.
II. HARPER v. VIRGINIA BOARD OF ELEcrioNs
The Court was not quite finished with the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. Two weeks after the abstractions of South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, came Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,54 holding
the poll tax unconstitutional.
The poll tax provision of the Act, § 10, is the result of much
travail in Congress. Section 10 "finds" that the poll tax inhibits vot-
ing by the poor, is not reasonably related to "any legitimate State
interest in the conduct of elections," and in some areas has the effect
of discriminating by race. "Upon the basis of these findings, Con-
gress declares that the constitutional right of citizens to vote is
denied or abridged in some areas by the requirement of the pay-
52 Id. at 335.
53 Compare the way in which the Court dealt, in Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145 (1965), with a new "citizenship" test adopted after suit in that case
had been filed.
54 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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ment of a poll tax as a pre-condition to voting. ' '5a But § 10 does
not outlaw the poll tax. Rather it authorizes and directs the At-
torney General to implement the declaration just recited by bring-
ing suit in the name of the United States for declaratory judgment
or injunctive relief against enforcement of the poll tax. Although
the point does not appear to have bothered the lower courts that
have acted under it,5" § 10 raises all that has not yet been interred
of the difficulty in Muskrat v. United States.5 7 Since Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections arose independently of § 10, however,
the Supreme Court did not need to concern itself with the Muskrat
issue. Nor, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, did the Court
concern itself with very much else.
The opinion, resting exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment, 8
takes comfort in contemporary constitutional history-everything
from Edwards v. California,"9 Skinner v. Oklahoma,6 0 Brown v.
Board of Education,61 and Malloy v. Hogan,62 to Reynolds v.
Sims;63 everything, that is, save the relevant precedents of Lassiter v.
Northhampton Education Board,6 4 which is dealt with lightly, and
Breedlove v. Suttes,65 which is overruled. "Voter qualifications,"
the Court said, "have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not
paying this or any other tax.... To introduce wealth or payment
of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is to introduce a
capricious or irrelevant factor."66 There was nothing in the Court's
55 383 U.S. at 348.
56See United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 384 U.S.
155 (1966); United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
57 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
58 Under the Fifteenth Amendment, the question, would, of course, have taken
on a different aspect. It would not have been easy to make out a case against the
poll tax as a vehicle for depriving Negroes of the vote. The tax has disfranchised
people, at least in combination with other factors, but it does not appear to have
been aimed solely at Negroes, or to have operated so as to disfranchise them alone.
See KEY, SoUrHERN Poui-ncs 534-35, 537-39, 542 et seq., 579, 585, 597-98, 600-08
(1950). Perhaps in Alabama, recent facts would have made it possible to build a
fairly strong Fifteenth Amendment case. See United States v. Alabama, supra
note 56.
59 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 63 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
60 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 64 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
61347 U.S. 483 (1954). 65 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
62 378 US. 1 (1964). 66 383 U.S. at 666, 668.
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opinion, Mr. Justice Black complained in dissent, "which advances
even a plausible argument as to why the alleged discriminations
which might be effected by Virginia's poll tax law are 'irrational,'
'unreasonable,' 'arbitrary,' or 'invidious' or have no relevance to a
single policy which the State wishes to adopt. The Court gives no
reason.... ."67 Mr. Justice Black, if one may say so, was quite right.
The Court gave no reason. It did not even notice the obvious argu-
ment, mentioned by Mr. Justice Harlan (in another dissent, joined
by Mr. Justice Stewart), that payment of a minimal poll tax might
rationally be thought to promote "civic responsibility, weeding out
those who do not care enough about public affairs to pay $1.50 or
thereabouts a year for the exercise of the franchise."6 8 This may
be thought a pretty argument and a worthy one, or it may be
thought ugly and mean. But irrational?
Mr. Justice Douglas flirted with, but did not adopt, a quite dif-
ferent position. He quoted Judge Thornberry, of the three-judge
court that struck down the Texas poll tax in a case arising under
§ 10, as remarking that if Texas were to place a tax, no matter how
small, on the right to speak, no court would hesitate to declare it
unconstitutional, for such a tax would be in blatant violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.6 9 Obviously, however, as Mr.
Justice Black suggested, the right to speak could also not be freely
abridged on the basis of age, illiteracy, conviction of a felony, or
residence; and yet the right to vote is commonly qualified on these
grounds.
III. KATZENBACH V. MORGAN
The third case of the term to pass on the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, Katzenbach v. Morgan,70 upheld § 4(e), giving the right
to vote to Spanish-speaking Puerto Ricans in New York. It was
decided together with a companion case, Cardona v. Power,7 which
had arisen and been disposed of in the New York courts before the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the Cardona case, without deciding the con-
stitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of the requirement
67 Id. at 676-77. 68 Id. at 685.
69 Id. at 665, n. 2, quoting from 252 F. Supp. at 254.
70 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 71 384 U.S. 672 (1966).
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of the New York law that voters be literate in English. (Justices
Douglas and Fortas, dissenting, would have held it unconstitu-
tional.) 72 So § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which forbids a
state to condition the vote of a person educated in an American-flag
school on his ability to read and understand the English language,
came to judgment on the assumption that the constitutionality of
literacy in English as a condition on the right to vote is an open
question under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court, Mr. Justice Brennan writing, began by restating a
point made in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, namely, that Congress
is empowered by § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment and § 5 of the
Fourteenth to enact legislation appropriate to those constitutional
provisions. Such legislation may reach into the affairs of the states
further and differently than the Amendments themselves, applied
by the courts without the aid of implementing legislation, would
necessarily do.73 This much is obvious enough. But in enacting ap-
propriate legislation, is it up to Congress to define the substance
of what the legislation must be appropriate to? If something is not
an action of a state denying or abridging the right of citizens of
the United States to vote, on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, may Congress say that it is, and thus reach
it by legislation? If something is not an irrational classification by
a state, may Congress say that it is and that it violates the Equal
Protection Clause, and thus reach it by legislation? Of course, Con-
gress may amass evidence and add the weight of its views, and thus
affect, and affect powerfully, the Court's judgment of the applica-
bility of the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. But may Con-
gress under those Amendments, any more than under, for example,
the Commerce Clause, determine the allocation of functions be-
tween federal and state governments, and the extent of its own
powers? May it determine, not what means are appropriate to the
enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, or to
the discharge of the function conferred by the Commerce Clause,
but the content of those Amendments and of that clause?
These questions did not arise in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
where only the appropriateness of the means chosen by Congress
was at issue. But in Katzenbach v. Morgan the Court did answer
73 See 383 U.S. at 325-27.
[1966
72 Id. at 675.
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these questions. For it rested its conclusion that § 4(e) is constitu-
tional at least in part on a holding that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment empowered Congress to act, whether or not, in the
judgment of the Court, the requirement of literacy in English may
be regarded as a discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause. It was urged, said the Court, "that § 4(e) cannot be sus-
tained as appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause unless the judiciary decides-even with the guidance of a con-
gressional judgment-that the application of the English literacy re-
quirement prohibited by § 4(e) is forbidden by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause itself. We disagree. ' 74 To the extent that the Court, in
this branch of its decision, purported to rely on evidence of the
intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, the sufficient
reply that can be made is James A. Garfield's to John A. Bingham
in the House, nearly a century ago. My colleague, said Garfield,
"can make but he cannot unmake history."75 Nothing is clearer
about the history of the Fourteenth Amendment than that its fram-
ers rejected the option of an open-ended grant of power to Congress
to meddle with conditions within the states so as to render them
equal in accordance with its own notions. Rather the framers chose
to write an amendment empowering Congress only to rectify ine-
qualities put into effect by the states. Hence the power of Congress
comes into play only when the precondition of a denial of equal
protection of the laws by a state has been met. Congress' view that
the precondition has been met should be persuasive, but it cannot
be decisive. That is the history of the matter.76 But perhaps the
Court meant to override history in order to bring § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment into harmony with some general premise of our
constitutional system.
Yet, while Congress must be allowed the widest choice of means
in the discharge of its function, the general premise of Marbury v.
Madison 7 7 and of M'Cullocb v. Maryland78 also, is that Congress
74 384 U.S. at 648.
75 Quoted in Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HA v. L. REv. 1, 60, n. 115 (1955).
7 0 See id. at 32-40; HARRIS, THE QUESr FOR EQUAL=TY 34-50 (1960). The argu-
ment in Frantz, Congressional Power To Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964), is not really to the contrary. See
73 YALE LJ. at 1358-59.
77 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 78 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
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does not define the limits of its own powers. It belongs, rather, to
the Court, exercising the function of judicial review, to do so. When
it applies the dormant Commerce Clause to the states, or when it
protects federal instrumentalities from taxation by the states, the
Court acts as a surrogate of Congress, and Congress, therefore, has
the last word.7 9 In a few other areas-taxation and spending for
the general welfare is one; exclusion of aliens has been thought to
be another-the Court, finding no standards to guide the exercise
of judicial review, has abandoned the function. But the function
has not yet been abandoned across the board. Whatever, then,
could be the reasons for abdicating judicial review in this area of
the Fourteenth Amendment, where it has been traditionally domi-
nant? Certainly no general presumption of our constitutional sys-
tem counsels any such abdication.
There is a second branch to the Court's decision in Katzenbach
v. Morgan, which is subtler and more interesting. Congress, said
the Court, may not have considered the New York requirement
of literacy in English as itself a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Rather Congress may have been concerned with evidence
of discriminatory treatment of the Puerto Rican community at
the hands of New York public agencies. The Court was able
to adduce no evidence of such discrimination, either out of the
materials that were before Congress or independently of those mate-
79 See Brown, The Open Economy: justice Frankfurter and the Position of the
Judiciary, 67 YALE LJ. 219, 221 (1957); FaauuN, Tim SuPREmm CoURT oF THE
UNrrFD STATES, 92, 93 (1961). But in a letter to Senator Robert F. Kennedy, dated
May 17, 1965, which the Senator relied on in the course of debate on § 4(e), Pro-
fessor Freund wrote: "It would be agreed, for example, that if a State were to
deny the franchise to Catholics or to a group of Protestants, the classification
could be struck down by Congress or the courts under the 14th amendments
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The courts do not have sole responsibility
in this area. Just as Congress may give a lead to the courts under the Commerce
Clause in prohibiting certain kinds of state regulation or taxation, and just as Con-
gress may expressly prohibit certain forms of taxation of Federal instrumentalities,
whether or not the courts have done so of their own accord, so in implementing
the 14th and 15th amendments Congress may legislate through a declaration that
certain forms of classification are unreasonable for purposes of the voting franchise."
111 CoNG. REc. 11062, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 20, 1965). But surely the
analogy between the respective functions of the Court and the Congress in the areas
of state taxation and regulation of interstate commerce and of state taxation of
federal instrumentalities, on the one hand, and the area of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, on the other, is too readily drawn by Professor Freund in this letter.
[1966
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rials.80 But perhaps, with some stretching, the presumption of
constitutionality should make up for this lack of evidence."' The
argument then proceeds in this fashion. Instead of directly attack-
ing the discrimination practiced against the Puerto Ricans, as it
80 The only item of relevant evidence cited (but not quoted, or even para-
phrased) by the Court is the following letter received in 1962 by the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and incor-
porated in the record of hearings the subcommittee held in the course of that
year on literacy tests and other voter qualifications. The letter, dated at New York,
April 16, 1962, is signed, Gene Crescenzi. It is short, and the gist of it needs to be
quoted in full:
"The fact of disfranchisement of these citizens [Puerto Ricans in New York]
operates to make them subject to all kinds of abuses and denials of the equal
protection of the law. More serious than this, a fifth column type of activity has
arisen in our governmental agencies and among elected public officials in respect
to the disfranchised Puerto Ricans.
"In the week of January 2 to 9, 1962, the employees of Flower Hospital went
on strike, they are mostly Puerto Ricans earning $35 to $40 per week, approxi-
mately 35 of these people were beaten and arrested. In this same week, the mayor
of New York raised his wages $10,000. On January 17th the General Sessions Court
announced that it would require probationers who don't speak English to learn
English, as the lack of English was the cause of their problems. I could write
volumes on the cruelty, brutality, murder, mayhem and general abuse delivered
upon the disfranchised Spanish-speaking citizens in New York by the various
agencies of our Government, all of which is directly due to their disfranchisement.
Having no vote, they have no representation and no means of redress.
"The English literacy requirement is an instrument of racist policies of the
State of New York, and it is used to circumvent the U.S. Constitution. It is more
vicious in its application in the State of New York because it has driven its racist
politicians underground, than in Southern States where segregation has long been
a way of life and may be fought in the open in the American way." Literacy Tests
and Voter Requirements in Federal and State Elections, Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 480,
S. 2750, and S. 2979, 87th Cong, 2d Sess. 507-08 (1962).
A statement in 1965 to a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary
by Herman Badillo, a leading Puerto Rican politician and now Borough Presi-
dent of The Bronx, pleaded for passage of what was to become § 4(e), but nowhere
charged discrimination in public services or by any public agencies in New York
against Puerto Ricans. See Voting Rights, Hearings before Subcommittee No. 5 of
the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 6400, House of Representatives, 89th
Cong., 1st Seas. 508-17 (1965).
81 The stretching, however, would be considerable. It would amount, to change
the figure somewhat, to a leap from a presumption buttressed by data, even if data
"offered not for the truth of the facts asserted but only to establish that responsible
persons have made the assertion and hold the opinions which are disclosed," FaREuND,
ON UNDERsrANING =ns SutPRium COURT 88, and see also 87-89 (1951), to a presump-
tion that makes up for the lack of any data at all-a presumption that, in a case such
as the present one, puts the party attacking constitutionality to the task of proving
a negative.
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could plainly have done under the Fourteenth Amendment, Con-
gress decided to reach it indirectly. It secured the vote for the
Puerto Rican community, in the belief that its political power
would then enable that community to ensure non-discriminatory
treatment for itself. The vote is thus seen as a means of enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment, not as itself the end of the congres-
sional action, and Congress is not in the position of having under-
taken to determine the substance of Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Congress is merely presumed to have established facts showing
that those rights, as judicially defined, have been or may be denied,
and of choosing a suitable remedy:
2
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to
assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations-the risk
or pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services,
the effectiveness of eliminating the state restriction on the right
to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or
availability of alternative remedies, and the nature and signif-
icance of the state interests that would be affected by the nulli-
fication of the English literacy requirement as applied to resi-
dents who have successfully completed the sixth grade in a
Puerto Rican school. It is not for us to review the congressional
resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to per-
ceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the con-
flict as it did.
The argument is superficially attractive. But suppose Congress
decided that aliens or eighteen-year-olds or residents of New
Jersey are being discriminated against in New York. The decision
would be as plausible as the one concerning Spanish-speaking
Puerto Ricans. Could Congress give these groups the vote? If
Congress may freely bestow the vote as a means of curing other
discriminations, which it fears may be practiced against groups
deprived of the vote, essentially because of this deprivation and
on the basis of no other evidence, then there is nothing left of state
autonomy in setting qualifications for voting. The argument proves
too much. The Court relied on Marshall's famous pronounce-
ment: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."8 3 The
82 384 U.S. at 653. 83 4 Wheat. at 421.
[1966
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Court duly emphasized appropriateness, and adaptation to a given
end, but it de-emphasized altogether too much Marshall's caveat
that the means chosen must also not be prohibited, and must "con-
sist with the letter and spirit of the constitution."' 4
IV. CONCLUSION
The impatience exhibited in South Carolina v. Katzenbach
with jurisdictional problems of first importance reflects sadly
both on the Court and on that very special officer of the Court,
the Solicitor General. The Court, to be sure, has been known to
swallow jurisdictional scruples before now, with no permanent
ill effect. But while no ominous view need be taken of this or other
isolated instances, only the most ominous of views can be taken
of the practice.
The Court's other two encounters with the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 are not a little ironic. No Justices have been more jealous
84 A dissent by Judge McGowan from the decision below, Morgan v. Katzenbach,
247 F. Supp. 196, 204 (D. D.C. 1965), and the opinion of a three-judge court in
New York in another case, in which an appeal was aborted by the intermediate
decision of Swift & Co. v. Wickhan (382 U.S. 111 [1965]), United States v.
County Board of Elections of Monroe County, 248 F. Supp. 316 (W.D. N.Y.
1965), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 383 U.S. 575 (1966), attempt to
rest the constitutionality of § 4(e) on a narrower and more persuasive ground,
though one that is also not free from difficulties. Being empowered to make rules
and regulations for the governance of territories, Congress bestowed citizenship
on natives of Puerto Rico, while at the same time permitting them to be educated
in schools in which the language of instruction is Spanish. It also permitted them
freely to migrate to the mainland. If Congress now thought that, having migrated
to the mainland, Puerto Ricans should not be deprived of a voice in the govern-
ment of whatever state they settled in because of a lack of literacy in English,
which is itself owing to the kind of education Congress provided them with, Con-
gress could, the argument runs, in pursuance of its power to govern the territories,
decree that Puerto Ricans must be allowed to vote whether or not literate in
English. From this point on, of course, the Supremacy Clause goes the rest of the
way to overcome the law of New York. But suppose Congress wanted Puerto Ricans
who were altogether illiterate to vote in New York. Or suppose it wanted natives
of Guam, whom it had not chosen to make citizens, to vote in New York. Or
suppose it wanted Puerto Rico, in its present status, not as a state, to be represented
in the Senate and to vote in presidential elections. Congress, moreover, also has
power to admit or exclude aliens, and to naturalize them or not. Suppose Con-
gress thought it well that aliens, or aliens of a given nationality, should vote in
state elections from the moment they arrived in a state, regardless of the length of
their residence, and regardless of their age, or of their previous criminal record.
Neither the power to govern territories nor the power to conduct foreign relations
has hitherto been thought necessarily to carry everything before it.
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guardians of the judicial prerogative, or more energetic wielders
of judicial power, than the governing majority of the present Court.
And yet Katzenbach v. Morgan constitutes restraint, if not abdica-
tion, beyond the wildest dreams of the majority's usual bete noire,
James Bradley Thayer, and in fact beyond anything he intended
to recommend. And Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections harks
attentively to even a timid hint from Congress. One doubts, never-
theless, that a new trend has really been inaugurated.
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